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FIXING THE SIXTIES: SIMPLIFY GOVERNMENT AND 
RESTORE HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
 




Take any frustration with overbearing or sluggish government, and ask 
yourself: Who has authority to fix it? Precisely. Referring back to the 1960s 
overhaul of American government, this Article argues that Washington 
requires a new philosophy of governing – that human responsibility must 
replace mindless rules at the point of action. Law should be reconceived as 
a framework for human responsibility, not an instruction manual that strives 
to supplant human judgment.  
 
I.  ATTACKING GOVERNMENT COMPLEXITY 
 TO ALLOW COMMON SENSE CHOICES 
 
 Americans are fed up with broken government, and want big change. 
What is missing so far in this raucous election is the vital ingredient of 
fundamental reform—a new vision of how to govern better. New blood in the 
White House, without a new governing philosophy, is unlikely to change 
much. Just as Barack Obama promised “Change We Can Believe In,” the 
2016 candidates tout their personal leadership qualities. But there’s no  
focus in the campaign on how to govern better. Calling for smaller 
government, as all Republicans do, does not provide a mandate for how to 
remake thousands of programs imbedded in old laws and thick regulations. 
The Tea Party approach of “just say no” hasn’t worked—most Americans 
want to fix, not eliminate, government functions. The absence of an 
alternative approach to governing is a reason why the federal government 
grew, not shrank, under the seven presidents—including two Democrats—
since 1968, notwithstanding their efforts to rein in government excesses.1  
Why does new leadership make so little difference? Liberal reformers 
tend to focus on campaign finance, gerrymandering, and other electoral 
distortions. But most choices in government are paralyzed by imbedded law and 
bureaucracy, not current political fights. In 2009, for example, Congress 
																																								 																				
* Philip K. Howard is senior Counsel at Covington & Burlington LLP and founder of Common 
Good, a nonpartisan national coalition dedicated to restoring common sense to America. 
1 See generally Reg Stats, REGULATORY STUDIES CTR, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., http://reg 
ulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited May 10, 2016) (For instance, the Code of 
Federal Regulations has increased from about 50,000 pages in 1968 to over 175,000 pages in 2014). 
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authorized nearly $800 billion to stimulate the economy, but no official had the 
legal authority to approve new infrastructure projects.2 Red tape, not 
partisanship, prevented President Obama from fixing broken bridges.3 What is 
missing in modern government is the critical ingredient of a functioning 
democracy: Human responsibility to get things done. Law has replaced 
leadership at every level of government, from the White House to the school 
house. Donald Trump won’t have a chance. He’ll say “You’re fired,” and the 
bureaucrats will smile and point to their invincible civil service protections.  
 Take any frustration with overbearing or sluggish government, and 
ask yourself: Who has authority to fix it? Precisely. Washington requires a 
new philosophy of governing––human responsibility must replace mindless 
rules at the point of action. Law should be reconceived as a framework for 
human responsibility, not an instruction manual that strives to supplant 
human judgment. The last time America overhauled its legal framework was 
the 1960s. The changes in that tumultuous decade demonstrate the power of 
a new governing vision. Revisiting that decade also reveals the wrong turn 
that has progressively paralyzed government.  
 
II. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
 
 The overhaul of American government in the 1960s was driven by a 
philosophical shift that redirected public priorities away from private ownership 
prerogatives towards reducing harm done to minorities, consumers and the 
environment. Scores of laws were written or changed that reflected this new 
public philosophy that has come to be known as the “rights revolution.”4  
 In one short decade the rights revolution broke down ancient practices 
of discrimination against minorities, women, and the disabled5; catapulted 
government into regulating product and worker safety6; created consumer 
rights7; and ended the ability of land owners to pollute private property and 
																																								 																				
2 See generally COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN INVESTMENT AND RECOVERY ACT FIVE YEARS LATER 34-
37 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_arra_report.pdf (describing 
how the Recovery Act allocated stimulus funds to various infrastructure projects). 
3 See Michael D. Shear, Obama Lesson: ‘Shovel Ready’ Not So Ready, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2010), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/obama-lesson-shovel-ready-not-so-ready 
/?_r=1 (describing how red tape stalled Obama’s infrastructure stimulus program implementation).   
4 See generally Sarah Staszak, Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State, 
38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 222, 22-26 (2013) (discussing the mid-twentieth century rights revolution).  
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000 et seq.). 
6 Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current version 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.). 
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common resources. These shifts in goals were long overdue. The new public 
narrative—expanding the vocabulary of rights to protect against any form of 
power—was unstoppable. Rights put the magnifying glass on the plight of 
the little guy, and posed the issue in a way that trumped the even the most 
influential defenders of the status quo. Are you for hurting people? 
 But the governing philosophy of the rights revolution went too far: 
It tried to eliminate abuses of authority not just by changing public values, 
but by eliminating authority. Its new way of governing was to write rules as 
precisely as possible—dictating exactly how to make a factory safe. Where 
rules could not dictate the choice—as with the scope of environmental 
review—the choice would be reached by consensus in drawn-out processes 
or by a lawsuit. Everyone, conservatives and liberals alike, bought into the 
idea of government where officials had minimal authority. Clear rules 
would replace fallible human judgment. “Administrative rule-making,” 
Professor Kenneth Davis pronounced, “is . . . one of the greatest inventions 
of modern government.”8 Democracy would be automatic, like a modern 
appliance.  
 Striving to dictate the most minute choices of government and 
regulation, however, leads to law that is incomprehensible. Today, after 50 
years of drafting to close every ambiguity with ever-more detailed rules, 
officials and citizens must hack through over 100 million words of law and 
regulation.9 The guiding principles of the Volcker Rule against bank 
proprietary trading, promulgated as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform, 
can be stated in a few paragraphs. The final rule is 950 pages.10 American 
regulation has become a form of central planning. It is sometimes better than 
no regulation at all, but its complexity is counterproductive and progressively 
paralytic. A safe workplace mainly turns on training and factory culture, not 
whether the light switch is so many inches from the door or the machinery 
has the latest guard mechanism.11 Environmental review must be timely; 
																																								 																				
8 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65 (1969).  
9 See Reg Stats, supra note 1 (The Code of Federal Regulations currently is about 175,000  
pages long, which itself is over 100 million words).  
10 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, VOLCKER RULE: U.S. AGENCIES APPROVE FINAL VOLCKER 
RULE, DETAILING PROHIBITIONS AND COMPLIANCE REGIMES APPLICABLE TO BANKING 
ENTITIES WORLDWIDE (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
SC_Publication_Volcker_Rule.pdf.  
11 See, e.g., William H. Simon, Optimization and Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank 
Regulation as an Example, 4 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 3 (2010) (discussing the culture 
of safety at Alcoa). The Kemeny Commission Report on the Three Mile Island nuclear 
meltdown famously concluded that overly voluminous rules had shifted workers’ focus away 
from overall safety and towards mindless compliance. The report found that “once 
regulations become as voluminous and complex as those regulations . . . [in place at Three 
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otherwise lengthy environmental review harms the environment by 
prolonging bottlenecks that cause pollution.12  
 The 1960s philosophy of avoiding human authority had the further 
baleful effect of anesthetizing America’s public culture. Public employees 
are trained to mindlessly follow rules, frustrating Americans in encounters at 
every level of government: “The rule made me do it.”13 Politicians also accept 
laws mindlessly, as if they were the Ten Commandments and not man-made 
tools which political leaders are supposed to fix when broken. President 
Obama is not to blame for the infrastructure red tape that strangled the 2009 
stimulus projects, but why didn’t he immediately propose a new law giving 
him similar authority to FDR’s in the New Deal? Republican leaders of 
Congress are not to blame for the undisciplined accretion of agency 
regulations—but why don’t they do something about the undisciplined 
accretion of their own statutes?  
 Governing without human authority, one of the pillars of the rights 
revolution, was supposed to avoid abuse. Instead it exacerbated a natural 
inclination by public officials to avoid responsibility. Political scientist 
Samuel Huntington saw it coming. “Who governs?” is obviously an 
important question, he observed. “Even more important, however, may be the 
question ‘Does anybody govern?’”14  
 
III. TOWARDS A NEW PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY:  
SIMPLIFY LAW AND RESTORE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 America’s public law must be radically simplified to require officials to 
take responsibility. Democracy is supposed to empower elected officials to make 
choices, not preempt their choices. Making room for human responsibility 
																																								 																				
Mile Island], they can serve as a negative factor in nuclear safety.” REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 9 (1979). 
12 PHILIP K. HOWARD, TWO YEARS, NOT TEN YEARS: REDESIGNING INFRASTRUCTURE 
APPROVALS 5-6, 13-15 (2015), http://commongood.3cdn.net/c613b4cfda258a5fcb_e8m6b 
5t3x.pdf.  
13 See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (discussing how public service workers wield much 
discretion in their implementation of public programs); Robert K. Merton, Bureaucratic 
Structure and Personality 18 SOCIAL FORCES 4 (1940) (“Discipline can be effective only if 
the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which entail devotion to one’s duties, 
a keen sense of the limitation of one's authority and competence, and methodical 
performance of routine activities. The efficacy of social structure depends ultimately upon 
infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments.”). 
14 MICHAEL J. CROZIER ET AL., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY: REPORT ON THE GOVERNABILITY 
OF DEMOCRACIES TO THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION 92 (1975). 
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requires radically simplifying legal codes into open frameworks of principles, 
like the Constitution, instead of striving to dictate in advance every possible 
choice. Some areas—for instance, pollution levels—require detailed rules. But 
the goal should be the same for almost all programs: Is an identifiable human 
responsible and free to act sensibly? The virtues of simplifying law are many. 
Law based on general goals and principles gives flexibility for people to adapt 
to the situation and make practical choices. It focuses disagreements on the 
ultimate goal—right and wrong—not parsing legal language. It reinvigorates 
democracy because decisions are made by people who can be held accountable, 
not disembodied rules. Law can be understood by real people. As Judge Richard 
Posner has observed, “[s]tandards that capture lay intuitions about right behavior 
. . . may produce greater legal certainty than a network of precise . . . non-intuitive 
rules . . . .”15 
 There’s a fear, which I will discuss, that leaving room for human 
judgment will open the door for abuse. But history shows otherwise, and 
demonstrates how radical legal simplification can energize a society and restore 
respect to government—for example, the Uniform Commercial Code in the 
1950’s, the Civil Code sponsored by Napoleon, and of course our own 
Constitution.16 The task is not as daunting as you might imagine, because 
restoring human responsibility obviates the need for 95 percent of the  
legal detail. Experience shows it is best implemented by delegating 
responsibility to a small committee of respected citizens, such as the Simpson 
Bowles committee or base-closing commissions. Then Congress can vote it up 
or down.  
In the 1980s Australia replaced a thousand rules for nursing homes 
with 31 general principles: for example, to provide a “homelike environment” 
and “[respecting] [t]he dignity of residents.”17 Within a year, nursing homes 
were markedly better.18 Regulators didn’t give up their power; arguably they 
had more authority. But disagreements now focused on the quality of care, 
not compliance with nitpicking rules.  
																																								 																				
15 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990). 
16 See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND 
BROKEN GOVERNMENT 147-49 (2014) (discussing the value of recodification efforts through 
history).  See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 377–
98 (2002) (discussing the development of the Uniform Commercial Code); Jean Louis 
Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1074-75 
(1988) (discussing the Napoleonic Code). 
17 See John Braithwaite &Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus 
Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 SOC. LEGAL STUD. 307, 313-16 (1995) (detailing 
reforms in nursing home regulation in light of a series of scandals). 
18 Id. 
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 This is the way many laws used to be written before the 1960s—law 
provided a framework for responsibility, not an instruction manual. The 1956 
statute authorizing the interstate highway system, for example, was 29 pages 
long.19 By 1970, about 30,000 miles of highway had been constructed.20 Today 
it would take almost that long to get permits. The brevity of law that sets goals 
and lines of authority will surprise people. A recent legislative proposal by 
Common Good to streamline infrastructure approvals from ten years to two 
years, for example, is less than three pages long: it allocates authority to 
environmental officials to decide when there’s been sufficient review, and 
expedites judicial review.21  
 Reinstating human responsibility to implement public decisions doesn’t 
guarantee good decisions, but it makes them possible and creates the conditions 
for accountability when they’re not. A leaderless legal process, by contrast, just 
ends up being a mosh pit at the government spigot—where self-interest is 
justified by contortions of legal language, and almost no one talks about what is 
right. The upshot of this legalistic culture is that the values of Washington are no 
longer confluent with those of the rest of society. This is the definition of a 
deviant subculture.22  
An overhaul of historic proportions is needed. Just as the shift in 
public philosophy in the 1960s had a clear approach, focusing on individual 
rights, so too simplifying American public law should have a clear standard 
by which all regulatory choices can be judged: What is the right thing to do 
here?  
 
IV. DISCARDING THE PHILOSOPHY OF DISTRUST 
 
 Distrust is the mortar that keeps the massive bureaucratic edifice in place. 
What if the environmental official is corrupt, inept or has ulterior motives? 
Giving officials authority to make choices is a terrifying prospect to most people. 
The rational answer is that, even with the authority to decide, the official still has 
to comply with laws, and is accountable to higher officials for his judgment, and 
to courts for legal compliance. The evidence overwhelmingly favors more 
responsibility. People taking responsibility are the secret sauce of any school or 
																																								 																				
19 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956). 
20 WENDELL COX & JEAN LOVE, THE BEST INVESTMENT A NATION EVER MADE 4 (1996), 
available at http://www.publicpurpose.com/freewaypdf.pdf.  
21 COMMON GOOD, POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO TITLE XXXI, SUBTITLE A—ACCELERATING 
PROJECT DELIVERY OF THE DRIVE ACT, TO SIMPLIFY AND STREAMLINE INFRASTRUCTURE 
REVIEW AND PERMITTING, http://commongood.3cdn.net/70cb063afe28bfd79f_vnm6b5jj6.pdf.  
22 See HOWARD supra note 16, at 137-42.  
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public department that works well.23 Official abuse is also best deterred, studies 
repeatedly conclude, by shining the spotlight on responsible people.24  
 Still, there is an instinctive revulsion to the idea of giving people in 
government any amount of authority. No matter how many checks and 
balances. The siren song of what is called “clear law” entices even the best 
minds. Conservative economist Friedrich Hayek wrote early in his career that 
“government in all its actions . . . [should be] bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand.”25 Liberal legal philosopher Joseph Raz advocates the 
“use [of] rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior” because 
they “lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application.”26  
 On the other hand, Aristotle observed that the need to adjust for  
the circumstances means that “it is impossible that all things should be precisely 
set down in writing.”27 “Justice . . . is a concept by far more subtle and indefinite,” 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed, than “is yielded by mere obedience to a 
rule.”28 Judgment on the spot, not any legal or rationalist directive, is required to 
get anything done. Historian Jacques Barzun put it this way: “No scientist has 
chosen a spouse or bought a house using scientific methods.”29 The future of good 
government hinges on this debate, and not for the first time. The tension between 
legal precision and human responsibility was the main fight in the constitutional 
debates. The anti-federalists wanted detailed limitations on state power.30 James 
																																								 																				
23 See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING 
AMERICA 64-65 (2011) (highlighting Sam Schwartz’s innovation in fixing Brooklyn’s 
Carroll Street Bridge); PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: RESTORING 
RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 93-121 (2010) (discussing the correlation between teacher 
autonomy and classroom success).  See also PASI SAHLBERG, FINNISH LESSONS: WHAT CAN 
THE WORLD LEARN FROM EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN FINLAND? (2011) (discussing the 
extremely decentralized Finnish education system). 
24 See, e.g., STATE-CITY COMMISSION ON INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO CITY PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS (1986) (showing 
how New York’s unwieldy and complex implementation of public contracting operations 
invited corruption).  See generally FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT 
OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 
(1996) (increasingly complicated mechanisms to combat corruption undermine governance). 
25 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75 (1944). 
26 Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841 (1972). 
27 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 81 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Thrift ed. 2000). 
28 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 87 (1924). 
29 JACQUES BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 162 (1983).  
30 See, e.g., THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 81 (Brutus) (“I showed, that the judicial 
power of the United States under the first clause of the second section of article eight, would 
be authorized [sic] to explain the constitution, not only according to its letter, but according 
to its spirit and intention; and having this power, they would strongly incline to give it such 
a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, as much as possible, to the 
diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states.”). 
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Madison argued in rebuttal that the first goal was to provide “powers [that] were 
necessary means of attaining . . .  necessary ends,” and not to agonize over “the 
possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust.”31  
George Washington similarly wrote that “no government can be well 
administered without powers,” and chastised opponents who fixate on 
immediate abuses and imagine official as “tyrants . . . [with] no other 
disposition but to oppress.”32 In the end, Washington concluded: 
 
No man is a warmer advocate for proper restraints and 
wholesome checks in every department of government than I 
am; but I have never yet been able to discover the propriety of 
placing it absolutely out of the power of men to render essential 
Services, because a possibility remains of their doing ill.33 
 
 Life is too complex to dictate decisions in advance, especially in this 
century. A fast-paced interdependent world requires more, not less, public 
oversight to safeguard common resources and protect against hidden risks. 
The more complex the world, however, the simpler law must be: “The 
simpler, the better” according to complexity theorist Nicholas Taleb.34 
People must feel free to act on what they understand to be social norms of 
right and wrong, and then be accountable, not get bogged down in intricate 
regulatory schemes they can barely understand. At the end of his life, Hayek 
recanted his earlier views of mechanical law, saying that he had 
reconsidered “the supposed greater certainty . . . [when] all rules of law 
have been laid down in written and codified form.”35 Ultimately law is more 
predictable when decisions are not made by “the letter of the law,” but “by 
generally held views of what is just.”36  
The best indictment of “clear law” is what it has wrought—a dense 
bureaucratic jungle that is progressively paralyzing daily choices in 
government and society. The dream of automatic government has 
undeniable appeal: we hoped to avoid bad judgment by avoiding all 
judgment. It just does not work. Americans’ frustration with Washington 
has reached a boiling point. It is time to look at broken government with 
																																								 																				
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
32 Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 9, 1787) (reproduced at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-bushrod-washington-2/).   
33 Id. 
34 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 11 (2012). 
35 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES AND ORDER 
116 (1973). 
36 Id. 
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clear eyes, and acknowledge the flaw in philosophy that has prevented any 
recent president from fixing it. “[U]nless government is first effective,” 
management theorist Peter Drucker concluded, “all the more ambitious 
goals will remain mere rhetoric . . .”37  
Ask again: Who today has authority to fix any problem? Simplifying 
legal codes, history shows, can transform society—like replacing a muddy 
road with a paved highway. The benefits here may be exponential, because 
the new codes will release human energy that for 50 years has been actively 
repressed by an anti-human legal philosophy. Fixing broken government 
requires a historic overhaul. The new governing philosophy, however, could 




37 Peter F. Drucker, Individual Freedom and Effective Government in a Society of Super-
powers, in POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (William V. D’Antonio & Howard J. 
Ehrlich eds., 1961). 
